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Abstract
We examine the impact of a new tool for suppressing the expression of dissent—a daily
tax on social media use. Using a synthetic control framework, we estimate that the tax
reduced the number of georeferenced Twitter users in Uganda by 13 percent. The estimated
treatment effects are larger for poorer and less frequent users. Despite the overall decline
in Twitter use, tweets referencing collective action increased by 31 percent and observed
protests increased by 47 percent. These results suggest that taxing social media use may
not be an effective tool for reducing political dissent.
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1 Introduction
Autocratic regimes have become increasingly interested in digital censorship, and new strategies
for controlling online information are rapidly spreading. After tests of internet shutdowns in the
Xinjiang province of China in 2009, governments shut down internet access nearly 190 times
in 2017 (Griffiths 2019). China has also been actively exporting its digital repression strategies
to other countries. In 2017, officials from Uganda met with members of a Chinese government
subsidiary to build capacity to monitor and prevent social media abuse (Mugerwa 2017). Later,
Uganda innovated on the set of tools available to authoritarian regimes by implementing a 200
shilling daily tax on users of social media.1 Critics view the tax as an attempt to suppress
political dissent ahead of upcoming elections, and even the Ugandan President has stated that
reducing “gossip” was an intended outcome of the tax (Crabtree 2018).
In this paper, we examine the impact of the social media tax on social media use and levels
of collective action in Uganda. Using georeferenced tweets from across sub-Saharan Africa
and exploiting the unexpected implementation of the social media tax, we compare outcomes
in Uganda relative to a synthetic control composed of non-treated countries with similar pre-
treatment trends (Abadie et al. 2010).
There was a large and sustained decrease in the number of active users on Twitter after
the tax. The tax decreased the number of unique Twitter users in each period by 13 percent
on average. New account registrations also dropped by 20 percent. Poorer and less frequent
users exhibited a larger change in behavior, with a 17 percent decrease in non-Apple users (a
proxy for wealth) and an 18 percent decrease in users who tweet less than once per day. These
estimated effects are large relative to a placebo distribution of non-treated countries.
Despite the reduction in overall social media use, tweets referencing collective action in-
creased by 31 percent in the period following the implementation of the tax. In contrast, there
was no meaningful increase in the overall level of tweets or tweets using political phrases not
related to collective action.2 The period after the tax’s implementation also experienced a 17
percent increase in the number of unique users discussing collective action. This increase in
1The tax is equivalent to $1.60 per day for the United States (normalized by GDP per capita PPP) and applies to
over 50 social media applications including Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter.
2Increasing the availability of information on collective action is particularly concerning for authoritarian regimes.
While the impact of increasing the flow of information on grievances against the government is theoretically
ambiguous depending on citizen expectations, information on the events themselves nearly always increases the
likelihood of successful coordination (Little 2016). Ananyev et al. (2017) make a related argument that less
competent governments will be more likely to invest in coordination censorship than content censorship. Observed
behavior of Chinese censorship corroborates the focus on collective action information (King et al. 2013).
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discussions of collective action online is mirrored by increases in physical protests and riots.
There was a 47 percent increase in observed protests and riots in the subsequent period in
Uganda relative to a synthetic control. Again, these estimated effects are large relative to the
placebo distribution of non-treated countries.
The tax could increase collective action through two potential mechanisms.
First, it could provide a signal of the regime’s type. The high salience of the tax as a form
of digital repression may have decreased coordination costs for collective action by creating a
focal point or providing common information (Chwe 2000; Tucker 2007; Egorov et al. 2009;
Chwe 2013). Alternatively, the signal from the tax could have shifted the perceived returns to
succesful protest and regime change. Qualitative evidence from news coverage of the tax and
the language used by oppositional leaders on Twitter corroborate the tax’s role as a rallying
point for collective action, and previous work has also suggested that the salience of repression
is an important determinant of the overall effect on dissent (Roberts 2018).
Second, the tax could increase collective action by altering the composition or structure
of the network. In network models of collective action, an individual’s decision to participate
often depends on the extent to which users within her local network participate (Chwe 2000;
Watts 2002; Barbera and Jackson 2019).3 If the likelihood of participating in collective action is
positively correlated with willingness to pay for Twitter, then the tax would increase the density
of activists on Twitter, increasing the likelihood of collective action.4 We find some empirical
support for this positive correlation, as users who are less sensitive to the tax (users with Apple
devices) are also more likely to tweet about collective action in the pre-intervention period.
Among autocratic regimes, China’s digital censorship and repression is most studied. It has
developed a sophisticated regime that focuses on censoring information on collective action and
actively produces information to distract from sensitive topics (King et al. 2013, 2014, 2017).
China also allows some forms of dissent on social media to assist in monitoring public opinion
and the performance of local officials (Qin et al. 2017). Long-run exposure to censorship in
China has reduced the incentives to acquire uncensored information (Chen and Yang 2017).
3Local network participation can be important for inference about global participation, information on the event
itself, and consumption value from social network participation. The importance of local network participation in
determining individual turnout for protests is also highlighted in recent empirical work (Burzstyn et al. 2019).
4See the Online Appendix for a model highlighting this relationship. Previous work has also pointed out that
the relationship between group size and collective action varies depending on other forms of network structure
(Oliver and Marwell 1988; Gould 1993; Siegel 2009). Hassanpour (2014) makes a related argument that full
connectivity can hinder collective action in threshold models. And, in models of information overload, a small
tax on sending messages will filter out low-value messages—potentially increasing consumption of information
on collective action (Van Zandt 2004; Anderson and de Palma 2009; Iyer and Katona 2016).
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However, the sudden and visible censorship of Instagram in China caused citizens to actively
seek out sensitive information (Hobbs and Roberts 2018).
In other contexts, disruptions to communication networks correlate with increases in real-
ized dissent (Hassanpour 2014), though they also appear to weaken the ability of organized
opposition groups to coordinate (Ghodes 2015). Physical repression against dissenting elites
in Saudia Arabia reduced criticism by those directly involved, but did not reduce overall levels
of criticism (Pan and Siegel 2018). More generally, the growth of electronic and online social
networks tends to increase protest activity (Manacorda and Tesei 2016; Enikopolov et al. 2017;
Enikopolov et al. 2018). We show that taxing social media can effectively reduce social media
use, but its high salience as digital repression and its impact on the underlying network struc-
ture can increase the likelihood of collective action. An important caveat is that we study the
short-run effect the tax, and the long-run effects may be different.
2 Ugandan Context
President Yoweri Museveni has ruled Uganda since 1986. In this span, the elimination of several
important constitutional limits on executive rule have allowed the 74-year-old to continue to
rule. In 2005, the two-term limit on the presidential office was removed. In 2017, the age
limit on the presidential office (75 years) was lifted—leading to a “brawl” in the Ugandan
parliament (BBC 2017). Museveni, who largely gathers electoral support from rural and aging
populations, has faced increasing difficulty connecting with the youth of Uganda. In contrast,
Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, a Ugandan pop-star with the stage name Bobi Wine, has quickly
risen to become the face of the opposition party after becoming a member of parliament in 2017
(Kagumire 2018). Kyagulanyi frequently uses social media, in addition to his music, to speak
directly about government failures and the hopes of the Ugandan people.
Within this growing discontent and opposition, Museveni and his government actively seek
to control the growth of digital dissent in Uganda. They have arrested dissenting voices on
social media for violating the 2011 Computer Misuse Act and shut down social media ser-
vices on Election Day in 2016 (Mugerwa 2017). In 2017, Ugandan officials met with a Chi-
nese government-owned subsidiary to provide Uganda with “technical capacity to monitor and
prevent social media abuse” across the more than 13 million internet users (Mugerwa 2017).
Shortly after, the Ugandan Communication Commission announced that they would launch
their own versions of popular social media platforms, mirroring a prominent Chinese strategy
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for monitoring and controlling information flows (Observer 2017). These alternative platforms
have yet to materialize.
In May 2018, the Ugandan parliament passed a bill creating a 200 shilling daily tax on
the use of any of more than 50 social media applications, along with a tax on mobile money
transfers. The tax was implemented on July 1, 2018, and is collected by telecommunication
companies via mobile money transfers (Crabtree 2018). The Online Appendix (Figure A1)
shows that there was a large spike in news articles referencing the “social media tax” after July
1, 2018 and limited discussion prior to this. In relative terms, the 200 shilling (roughly $0.05
USD) per day tax is large. The GDP per capita (PPP) for Uganda was $1,864 in 2017 relative
to $59,532 in the United States, per the World Bank. Annualizing the $0.05 per day gives a tax
burden of the social media tax at roughly 1 percent of Uganda’s GDP per capita. In comparison,
the median willingness-to-pay estimate from Sunstein (Forthcoming) for Twitter is $5.00 per
month or 0.1 percent of the United States’ GDP per capita.
Many view the tax as a form of digital repression by Museveni who hopes to limit social
media use for the upcoming 2021 presidential election (Crabtree 2018). Protests, led by Kyag-
ulanyi, occurred shortly after the tax’s implementing, and Kyagulanyi, who announced he will
also campaign in the 2021 presidential election, has been subsequently arrested multiple times
(Al Jazeera 2019).
3 Data and Empirical Framework
Our primary data consists of georeferenced tweets from 50 sub-Saharan Africa countries and
territories (hereafter, “countries”) collected from the one percent Twitter Streaming API. For
each tweet, the API returns the text, the time of the tweet, and various user characteristics at the
time of the tweet. We pass a global bounding box to the streaming API, delivering an estimated
1/3 to 1/2 of all georeferenced tweets (Leetaru et al. 2013; Steinert-Threlkeld 2018). The
tweets are assigned to their respective countries using the provided geolabelling from Twitter.
We collapse observations into ten day periods and exclude countries in the bottom quintile of
unique users (e.g., Central African Republic and Eritrea).
For data on collective action events, we merge data on riots and protests as recorded by
ACLED and ICEWS (Raleigh et al. 2010; Boschee et al. 2015). Separately, for each dataset,
we compute the number of events occuring in a given time period. We then take the average
across both datasets for a given country in a given period. We restrict attention to countries that
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appear in both our ACLED and ICEWS samples.
To estimate the impact of the social media tax, we adopt a synthetic control approach
(Abadie et al. 2010). For inference, we compare the estimated treatment effect for Uganda
τˆ0t to the placebo distribution of estimated effects Pt created by repeating the synthetic control
procedure for each control unit and scaling these placebo effects by the ratio of the root mean
squared prediction error (RMSE) in the pre-intervention period for Uganda and the RMSE for
the corresponding control unit.
See the Online Appendix and the replication code for additional details.
4 Results
4.1 Effect of the Tax on Social Media Use
Panel A of Figure 1 plots the log of unique, active Twitters users in Uganda relative to Rwanda,
Kenya, and Ghana in each ten day period surrounding the implementation of the social media
tax.5 Panel B uses the average of the other countries in the estimation sample. In the 100
days prior to the tax, Uganda followed a similar trend relative to the other countries. After
the tax, however, Twitter use in Uganda is systematically lower. When comparing Uganda to
the synthetic control constructed via the procedure outlined above, Panel C makes this post-tax
distinction even clearer. The synthetic control matches Uganda closely in the entire pre-tax
period, but there is sharp break in trend at the onset of the tax that persists throughout the
post-treatment period.
Panel D of Figure 1 plots the estimated treatment effect of the social media tax on Twitter
use. The estimates suggest that the daily willingness to pay for Twitter remains below 200
shillings during most periods for 10 to 20 percent of users. Furthermore, the estimated effect is
consistently outside the .025 and .975 quantiles of the scaled placebo distribution.
Tweet and user characteristics in the Twitter dataset reveal heterogeneous effects of the tax.
For each category and period, we determine the number of unique users displaying a character-
istic at least once.6 We then re-estimate the synthetic control treatment effects and report the
5We define an active user to be one that has an observed tweet during a given period. The countries selected in
Panel A have the highest weights in the synthetic control estimates.
6See the Online Appendix for additional details on how these groups are constructed. These treatment effects
incorporate the combined effect on Twitter use and user characteristics conditional on use because the user char-
acteristics are not always defined prior to the tax. However, the user characteristics considered here are unlikely
to be effected by the tax in the timespan examined.
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average of the post-intervention treatment effects along with the corresponding placebo distri-
butions.
Figure 2 shows the tax had a larger effect on newer, less frequent, and poorer users. There
was a 20.1 percent reduction in new account creation as a result of the tax. For users that
tweeted less than one tweet per day on average, there was a 17.8 percent drop. For individuals
without an Apple device (an indicator of wealth), we see a 16.8 percent reduction. In contrast,
there was an estimated 12.7 percent decrease across all users.
To address concerns regarding anticipatory effects and overfitting, the Online Appendix
(Figure A1) examines the robustness of the main treatment effects to only using data from more
than 100 days before the onset of the tax to fit the synthetic control. The Online Appendix
(Figures A2 and A3) also shows the results of a falsification test using pre-tax data only and the
estimated treatment effects when using 1, 7, and 28-day aggregation periods. Lastly, the Online
Appendix (Figure A4) reports the full time path of all treatment effects considered here and in
the section below.
4.2 Effect of the Tax on Collective Action
To examine the impact of the tax on collective action, we first construct an indicator for whether
a tweet contains phrases associated with collective action (e.g., “protest” and “rally”).7 Figure 3
shows an estimated 31.3 percent increase in the number of tweets referencing collective action
events in response to the tax. In contrast, there is no meaningful increase in the total number of
tweets or the number of tweets containing political phrases unrelated to collective action (e.g.,
“president” and “government”).
The increase in the amount of online discussion of collective action is partly driven by an
increase in the number of unique users participating in these discussions. Figure 3 shows a 17.1
percent increase in the number of users that discuss collective action in a given period. This
increase is statistically significant relative to the placebo distribution.
To examine whether this increase in online discussion of collective action is associated with
an increase in offline activity, we use data on protests and riots from ACLED and ICEWS. We
use the averaged value for the number of events recorded across both datasets for a given period.
Figure 3 suggests that collective action events increased by 46.7 percent after the implementa-
tion of the tax—well outside the .025 and .975 quantiles of the placebo distribution. The Online
7See the Online Appendix for the complete list of collective action and political phrases. English is Uganda’s only
official language, and there is limited Twitter support for local languages.
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Appendix (Figure A4, last panel) shows that the estimated treatment effects on collective action
events are highest in the first 100 days after the tax’s implementation.
The Online Appendix (Figure A5) reports the results of a falsification test where the syn-
thetic control is estimated with data more than 100 days prior to the tax’s implementation and the
estimated treatment effects are averaged over the 100 day pre-implementation period. Consis-
tent with the tax driving the effect on collective action outcomes, the average estimated effects
in the falsification test are either negative or not statistically meaningful. The Online Appendix
(Figure A6) also reports sensitivity analysis to alternative specifications of the outcome vari-
ables.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Censorship strategies face a trade off between decreasing access to sensitive information and
creating visible evidence of government interference in the information environment that has a
tendency to create backlash from those experiencing it.8 Backlash is a key reason the Chinese
government has shifted towards more subtle approaches to censorship, including flooding social
media with benign information that distracts from sensitive topics (King et al. 2017; Roberts
2018). Highly salient forms of digital repression can also reduce coordination costs for col-
lective action by creating a focal point or providing common information (Chwe 2000; Tucker
2007; Egorov et al. 2009; Chwe 2013).
News coverage of Uganda corroborates this mechanism:
[the social media tax] backfired, and the backlash was fierce. Young Ugandans,
who organised online under #NoSocialMediaTax and #ThisTaxMustGo hashtags,
poured into the streets of the capital city Kampala to express their anger against the
government. (Durmaz 2019)
The language used by opposition leaders on Twitter also suggests the tax acted as a focal point.
Under the handle @HEBobiWine, Kyagulanyi tweeted the following on July 11, 2018,
..there’s no amount of bullets, teargas or arrests that will stop us. Some of our
colleagues have been beaten up and others arrested. They must be freed for they
have nothing against the police but rather the terrible tax. [...] #ThisTaxMustGo.
8Streisand effects can also increase consumption of specific pieces of sensitive information by drawing attention
to and updating beliefs on what the government does not want citizens to be aware of (Nabi 2014; Jansen and
Martin 2015; Roberts 2018).
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The Online Appendix (Figure A7) shows that over 30 percent of collective action tweets in
the ten days after the tax’s implementation include the string “tax,” whereas this proportion is
typically below 5 percent.
In addition to the signalling value of the tax, the effect of the tax on the composition or
structure of the network can alter collective action outcomes. In network models of collective
action, an individuals’ decision to participate often depends on the participation rate of her
local network (Chwe 2000; Watts 2002; Barbera and Jackson 2019). If tendency for collective
action and willingness to pay the tax are positively correlated, then the tax could increase the
likelihood of successful coordination of collective action by increasing the density of activists.
In the Online Appendix, we develop a model following Jackson and Yariv (2007), but allowing
for endogenous Twitter use, to highlight the importance of this correlation. Table A2 in the
Online Appendix shows that Apple users and long-time users are more likely to tweet about
collective action in the pre-intervention period. These users are also users who are more likely
to continue using Twitter after the tax, thus, providing some evidence for the tax altering the
network composition in a way that could facilitate collective action.
While both mechanisms are consistent with aspects of the data, we are unable to differentiate
which, if any, of the aforementioned mechanisms are the primary driver for the increase in
collective action in the period after the tax. Furthermore, we can not exclude the possibility that
other concurrent changes are driving the observed trends rather than the tax itself. However,
the anecdotal evidence and language of elites suggest that the tax was an important impetus to
subsequent collective action.
Overall, the results suggest the economic forces driving selection into social media use
and the signalling value of the tax likely caused this form of digital repression to backfire by
increasing collective action despite the reduction in social media users.
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Figure 1: Impact of Tax on Twitter Use
Panel A: Uganda vs. Select Other Countries
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Panel B: Uganda vs. Average of Other Countries
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Panel C: Uganda vs. Synthetic Control
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Panel D: Treatment Effect Estimates
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Notes: Panel A compares the log of one plus the number of unique, active users in each ten day period for Uganda
(black) and select other African countries (grey). Panel B compares the log of one plus the number of unique,
active users in each ten day period for Uganda (black) and the average of the African countries and territories kept
after the sample restrictions (grey). The difference between the log of one plus the number of users in Uganda
versus the other African countries in the period immediately prior to the intervention (t = −1) is subtracted from
the series for each individual country (Panel A) and the average (Panel B). Panel C plots the log of one plus the
number of unique, active users in Uganda during each ten day period alongside the synthetic control. Panel D
plots the estimated treatment effect τˆ0t of the social media tax on the log of one plus the number of unique, active
users in Uganda. The shaded region indicates the .025 and .975 quantiles of the scaled placebo distribution Pt.
The vertical line indicates the 10 day period immediately prior to when the social media tax was implemented in
Uganda (July 1, 2018).
13
Figure 2: Effect of the Tax on User Composition
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various outcomes along with the .025 and .975 quantiles of the scaled placebo distribution P (grey bars). See the
text and Online Appendix for definitions of each outcome.
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Figure 3: Effect of the Tax on Collective Action
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Notes: The figure plots the average estimated treatment effect 1
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t≥0 τˆ0t (dot) of the social media tax on
various outcomes along with the .025 and .975 quantiles of the scaled placebo distribution P (grey bars). See the
Online Appendix for further details on each outcome.
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A1 Online Appendix
A1.1 Additional Data Details
See replication code for exact details on the data construction.
A1.1.1 Twitter Outcomes
For the Twitter outcomes, we restrict the set of countries for which we use to construct the
synthetic control to those in the top 80 percent of the sample of sub-Saharan African countries
with respect to the average number of unique, active users per period, and we do this separately
for each level of temporal aggregation. We also exclude tweets whose user description contains
phrases associated with bot activity.9 For all logged variables, we use the log of one plus the
level.
• New accounts: The number of users in our dataset who created their Twitter account in a
given period.
• Infrequent users: Users who, upon their first appearance in our dataset, averaged less than
one tweet per day as measured by the number of posted statuses listed on their account
and the date of account creation.
• Not Apple users: Users for which our dataset never contains a tweet posted via “ios,”
“ipad,” or “iphone” in a given period.
• Student users: Users for which the user description or user location includes “university,”
“college,” “universite,” “universita,” “universidade,” “faculdade” or “student” for at least
one tweet in our dataset in a given period.
• Activist users: Users for which at least one tweet contains a phrase referencing collecting
action in a given period.10
• Political users: Users for which at least one tweet contains a phrase referencing the gov-
ernment in a given period.11
9“weather,” “4:20,” “job,” “career,” “hire,” and “hiring.”
10‘protest’, ‘rally’, ‘rallies’, ‘ freedom of assembly ’, ‘ freedom of expression ’, ‘ riot’, ‘march against’, ‘march
with’, ‘inciting violence’, ‘unlawful assembly’, ‘civil unrest’, ‘demonstration’, ‘i stand with’, ‘take to the street’,
‘taking to the street’, or ‘boycott’
11‘supreme court’, ‘legislator’, ‘election’, ‘president’, ‘vote’, ‘ballot’, ‘administracao’, ‘presidente’, ‘ mp ’,
‘constitution’, ‘partisan’, ‘ mps ’, ‘administration’, ‘dictator’, ‘gouvernement’, ‘citizen’, ‘republic’, ‘political
party’, ‘political parties’, ‘parlement’, ‘parliament’, ‘government’, ‘ law ’, ‘constituent’, ‘governo’, ‘democrac’,
‘politic’, ‘amministrazione’, ‘military’, ‘constituency’, and ‘parlamento’.
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• Collective action tweets: Tweets containing at least one phrase referencing collective
action as defined above for activist users.
A1.1.2 ACLED and ICEWS Outcomes
The ACLED data includes all countries in Africa and is described by Raleigh et al. (2010).
It was downloaded from https://www.acleddata.com/ on March 6, 2019. We restrict attention
to events labelled as “Riots/protests.” Other event categories include, among others, “Violence
against citizens” and “Battle-No change of territory.”
The ICEWS data comes from Boschee et al. (2015). It is a machine-coded dataset that
generates 20 event types, one of which is protests. Of the 45 events in Uganda during the main
window of analysis, none are exact duplicates.12
Separately, for each dataset, we compute the number of events that occur in a given time
period. We then take the average across both datasets as our baseline measure of the number of
collective action events for a given country in a given period, where this measure is appropri-
ately transformed depending on the specification (e.g., log). We restrict attention to countries
that appear in both our ACLED and ICEWS samples throughout. For all logged variables, we
use the log of one plus the level.
12Defined by source, actor, target, and location.
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A1.2 Additional Empirical Details
To estimate the impact of the social media tax, we adopt a synthetic control approach (Abadie
et al. 2010). Let Yit(1), Yit(0) be outcome Y for country i at time t with and without the social
media tax respectively. Let i = 0 represent Uganda, i ∈ {1, ..., N} represent the control coun-
tries, and t ∈ {−T0, ..., 0, ..., T1} be the timespan considered where 0 indicates the first period
in which the social media tax was implemented (July 1, 2018). Each time period represents a
10-day span.
Assume
Yit(0) = δt + λt · µi + it (1)
where δt is a constant factor across countries, µi is a vector of unobserved factors for each
country i with time-varying loadings λt, and it is a mean zero error term. The treatment effect
of the tax τ is assumed to be additive, but can vary across countries and time
Yit(1) = Yit(0) + τit. (2)
Under mild conditions,13 if a vector of weights w, where
∑N
j=1wj = 1 and wj ≥ 0 for all
j ∈ {1, ..., N}, is chosen such that∑Nj=1wjYjt(0) = Y0t(0) holds approximately for all t < 0
when T0 is relatively large, then
τˆ0t = Y0t(1)−
N∑
j=1
wˆjYjt(0) (3)
provides an unbiased estimate of τ0t.14
For inference, we compare the estimated treatment effect for Uganda τˆ0t to the placebo
distribution of estimated effects created by repeating the synthetic control procedure for each
control unit. Specifically, we estimate τit for each control unit and compute the associated mean
squared prediction error
σ2i =
1
T0
∑
t<0
(Yit(0)− Yˆit(0))2.
We then compare τˆ0t to the scaled placebo distribution Pt = {τˆ1 σ0σ1 , ..., τˆN σ0σN }. Scaling by σ0σi
accounts for systematic differences in how well the synthetic control performs across countries
(e.g., a country on the edge of the convex hull will tend to perform poorly). An estimate of τˆ0t
outside the .025 and .975 quantiles of Pt is indicative of a statistically meaningful effect. Note
13See Abadie et al. (2010).
14In estimating the weights, we choose w to minimize ||X0 − X1w|| =
√
(X1 −X0w)′I(X1 −X0w) where
X0 = (Y0,T0(0), ..., Y0,−1(0))
′,X1 is an analogous matrix over the control units, and I is an identity matrix. We
estimate the weights separately for each outcome of interest.
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that these are point-wise distributions.
See replication code for exact details on the estimation procedures.
A1.3 Model of Collective Action with Social Media Tax
The following discussion builds on Jackson and Yariv (2007). There is a continuum of agents.
Each agent decides whether to pay a price q and join Twitter. Users have an intrinsic valuation
of Twitter wi ≥ 0 with c.d.f. Fw.
Each agent subsequently chooses whether to participate in a protest and has costs of par-
ticipating ci ≥ 0. The utility from participating in the protest is a function of the average
participation of connections on Twitter v(x) (where Twitter connections are formed randomly
from the population of Twitter users), and that v(·) is an increasing function in x.15
Let ci and wi be jointly normal with mean µ and variance Ω. Agents will choose to protest
if v(x) > ci. Let Fc|wi≥q−v(x) denote the conditional distribution of idiosyncratic protest costs
for users on Twitter for a given rate of protest participation x. Following Jackson and Yariv
(2007), we have that
x = φ(x) ≡ Fc|wi≥q−v(x)[v(x)]
characterizes the symmetric Bayesian equilibria of the game.
This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Impact of tax depends on the covariance Ωcw between Twitter valuations wi and
protest costs ci.
1. If q′ > q and Ωcw < 0, then q′ will generate more diffusion of behavior on the Twitter
network.
2. If q′ > q and Ωcw > 0, then q′ will generate less diffusion of behavior on the Twitter
network.
Proof. Note that Fc|wi≥q−v(x)[v(x)] is an increasing [decreasing] function in q for all x when
Ωcw < 0 [Ωcw > 0]. Therefore, φ(x, q′) > φ(x, q) [φ(x, q′) < φ(x, q)] for all x.
Proposition 1 of Jackson and Yariv (2007) states that, for two regular environments,16 an
environment φ˜(·) will generate greater diffusion of behavior17 than φ(·) if φ˜(x) ≥ φ(x) for all
x.
15Define x ≡ 0 for non-Twitter users and v(0) = 0.
16See Jackson and Yariv (2007) for technical details.
17In the sense that tipping points are lower and stable equilibria are higher.
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A1.4 Online Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Robustness to Restricting Model Fitting Period
Panel A: Estimated Treatment Effects
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Notes: Panel A shows the log of one plus the number of users per period in each 10-day period for Uganda relative
to the synthetic control. The solid vertical line indicates the 10 day period immediately prior to when the social
media tax was implemented in Uganda (July 1, 2018). The dashed vertical line indicates the last period which
was used to fit the synthetic control. Panel B shows the total number of news articles, as measured by data from
BuzzSumo, referencing “social media tax” with a .ug domain in each 10-day period.
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Figure A2: Effect of the Tax on User Composition – Falsification Test
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Estimated Effect of Tax
Notes: The figure plots the average estimated treatment effect (dot) of the social media tax on various outcomes
along with the .025 and .975 quantiles of the scaled placebo distribution P (grey bars) when restricting the model
fit of the synthetic control to more than 100 days prior to the tax. The average of the estimated treatment effects
are then taken over the 100 days prior to the tax. See Section A1.1 for further details on each outcome and Figure
2 to compare to the true estimated treatment effects.
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Figure A3: Robustness to Other Levels of Aggregation
Panel A: 1-day Aggregation
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Panel B: 7-day Aggregation
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Panel C: 28-day Aggregation
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Notes: The figure shows the estimated effect of the tax on the log of one plus the number of unique, active users
in a given period using various levels of temporal aggregation. Panel A uses 1-day periods, Panel B uses 7-day
periods, and Panel C uses 28-day periods. Panel A uses every 10th period in the pre-tax period forX0 in estimating
the weights. Panel B uses every 4th period in the pre-tax period for X0 in estimating the weights. Panel C uses
all periods in the pre-tax period for X0 in estimating the weights. Since Panels A and B do not use all pre-
intervention periods for X0, the weights are chosen to minimize
√
(X1 −X0w)′V(X1 −X0w) where V is a
positive definite diagonal matrix chosen to minimize the mean squared prediction error across all pre-intervention
periods. The shaded region indicates the .025 and .975 quantiles of the scaled placebo distribution Pt. The vertical
line indicates the 10 day period immediately prior to when the social media tax was implemented in Uganda (July
1, 2018).
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Figure A4: Time Path of Estimated Treatment Effects
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Notes: The figure reports the estimated treatment effects of the social media tax on various outcomes in Uganda
during each ten day period relative to a synthetic control. The shaded region indicates the .025 and .975 quantiles
of the scaled placebo distribution Pt. The vertical line indicates the 10 day period immediately prior to when the
social media tax was implemented in Uganda (July 1, 2018). See Section A1.1 for details on the construction of
each outcome variable.
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Figure A5: Effect of the Tax on Collective Action – Falsification Test
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Notes: The figure plots the average estimated treatment effect (dot) of the social media tax on various outcomes
along with the .025 and .975 quantiles of the scaled placebo distribution P (grey bars) when restricting the model
fit of the synthetic control to more than 100 days prior to the tax. The average of the estimated treatment effects
are then taken over the 100 days prior to the tax. See Section A1.1 for further details on each outcome and Figure
3 to compare to the true estimated treatment effects.
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Figure A6: Effect of the Tax on Collective Action – Robustness
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Estimated Effect of Tax
Notes: The figure plots the average estimated treatment effect 1
T1+1
∑
t≥0 τˆ0t (dot) of the social media tax on
various outcomes along with the .025 and .975 quantiles of the scaled placebo distribution P (grey bars). The
‘Prop. Collective Users,’ ‘Prop. Collective Tweets,’ and ‘Collective Action Events’ outcomes are scaled by 100,
500, and 0.3 respectively. The ‘Prop.’ outcomes report the proportion of users that are collective action users or
the proportion of tweets that are collective action tweets. See the main text and Section A1.1 for additional details
on each outcome.
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Figure A7: Collective Action Tweets Mentioning the Tax
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Notes: The plot shows the proportion of collective action tweets mentioning ‘tax’ in Uganda in each 10 day period.
The solid vertical line indicates the 10 day period immediately prior to when the social media tax was implemented
in Uganda (July 1, 2018).
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Table A1: Top 10 Weights for Synthetic Control
Users (log) Infrequent Users (log) Activist Users (log) Tweets (log) Collective Action Tweets (log)
Country Weight Country Weight Country Weight Country Weight Country Weight
GH 0.312 GH 0.376 KE 0.302 KE 0.394 KE 0.315
KE 0.288 KE 0.204 GH 0.214 CM 0.169 ZW 0.215
RW 0.152 CD 0.128 ZW 0.143 TZ 0.112 ZM 0.210
ET 0.059 ZM 0.113 AO 0.100 SN 0.064 SL 0.078
SO 0.058 RW 0.105 ZM 0.064 GN 0.052 MU 0.052
CD 0.049 ET 0.046 MZ 0.057 BJ 0.042 AO 0.050
ZM 0.032 SO 0.029 RE 0.034 GH 0.035 SZ 0.025
BI 0.024 TD 0.000 MU 0.032 BI 0.034 RW 0.021
NE 0.023 SN 0.000 CV 0.028 TD 0.026 MW 0.020
SN 0.002 ZW 0.000 SZ 0.026 ZW 0.018 BJ 0.008
Notes: The table shows the top ten countries along with their associated weights use for constructing the synthetic control for each outcome variable.
Country is the two-letter ISO 3166 country code.27
Table A2: Determinants of Collective Action and Political Tweets
Dependent Variable: Collective Action Tweets Political Tweets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Apple User × .01 0.077 25.804 0.001 -0.316 -10.660 -0.000
(0.039) (12.148) (0.000) (0.249) (8.375) (0.002)
Frequent User × .01 0.017 5.985 0.038 -0.238 -7.310 -0.058
(0.032) (11.025) (0.035) (0.264) (7.533) (0.164)
Student User × .01 -0.065 -25.099 -0.001 0.918 24.618 0.012
(0.047) (19.076) (0.001) (0.419) (10.660) (0.004)
Longtime User × .01 0.106 38.093 0.116 0.372 10.607 0.001
(0.041) (15.834) (0.035) (0.333) (9.650) (0.173)
Level of Observation Tweet Tweet 10-day Period Tweet Tweet 10-day Period
Estimator OLS Logit OLS OLS Logit OLS
Period FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Location FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters 17016 16646 17016 17016 17007 17016
Observations 483090 476652 81393 483090 482860 81393
Notes: Table shows the results of regressing measures of collective action or political tweets on user and
period characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) use an indicator for whether a tweet contains a collective
action phrase. Column (3) collapses observations by user id, location, and 10-day periods by taking
the mean of each variable over the associated set of tweets. Columns (4)–(6) are analogous, but use
a measure of whether a tweet contains a political phrase not related to collective action. Fixed effects
for 10-day periods and location name as assigned by Twitter are included throughout. Observations are
restricted to the period prior to the tax, and to tweets where both the user language and tweet language is
specified as English. All independent variables reported are scaled by .01. ‘Apple User’ is an indicator
for whether the tweet came from an Apple device; for Columns (3) and (6), it is an indicator for whether
a user tweeted from an Apple device at least once during the period. ‘Frequent User’ is an indicator for
whether an individual tweeted more than once per day between joining Twitter and when they initially
appear in our data. ‘Student User’ is an indicator for whether the user included a university-related phrase
in their description or location at the time of the tweet; for Columns (3) and (6), it is an indicator for
whether a university-related phrase appears in the description or location for at least one tweet during
the period. ‘Longtime User’ is an indicator for whether an individual joined Twitter more than four
years prior to the start of the tax. Coefficients are reported throughout, and standard errors reported in
parentheses below are clustered at the user level.
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